加爾文論罪觀(基督教要義2.1-5摘要)

 

2.1原罪論

2.2. 人現在被剝奪了意志自由

 

2.1原罪論

2.1.1但我們一想到最初的尊嚴,就不能不立刻想到我們羞辱的悲慘景況,因為在第一人身上我們從原來的狀態中墮落了。於是我們對自己就生厭惡的感覺和真謙虛,而汲汲於尋求上帝,好在他裡面恢復我們所發現為自己所完全缺乏的美德。But that primal worthiness cannot come to mind without the sorry spectacle of our foulness and dishonor presenting itself by way of contrast, since in the person of the first man we have fallen from our original condition. From this source arise abhorrence and displeasure with ourselves, as well as true humility; and thence is kindled a new zeal to seek God, in whom each of us may recover those good things which we have utterly and completely lost.

 

2.1.2雖然有些人在意見上比較謙虛,多少把一些東西讓與上帝,免得露出自己完全佔有一切的嫌疑,但他們巧於歸功自己,以致自滿和自持的主要原因依然存在。如果他們聽到一些與他心中原有的驕氣相契合的恭維話,他們便高興異常。所以凡在講道中頌揚人性優美的人,在各時代無不大受歡迎。但這種對人性優美的頌揚,叫人自滿自愛,無非叫人發生幻想,至終自陷於最可怕的滅亡。如果我們一味自持,籌畫,決定和經營一些自己以為有益的事,一經嘗試,就發現自己缺乏正確的知識和真道德,卻繼續進行,直到陷於毀滅為止,這對我們到底有什麼益處呢?

 

2.1.4亞當所犯的罪燃著了神對全人類的震怒火焰,可見這罪的性質不是一宗輕微的過失,乃是一宗嚴重而可惡的罪行,以致遭受這麼嚴勵的懲罰。奥古斯丁認為驕傲是萬惡之首的這見解是很對的,因為人若不因野心而膽大妄為,盡可以繼續保持他原來的地位。上帝的話即被輕蔑,尊敬上帝的心必然蕩然無存;因為我們要專心注意上帝的言語,才可以長久尊敬他的偉大和聖潔。所以不信就是亞當背叛的根源And surely, once we hold God’s Word in contempt, we shake off all reverence for him. For, unless we listen attentively to him, his majesty will not dwell among us, nor his worship remain perfect. Unfaithfulness, then, was the root of the Fall.

 

2.1.5亞當的屬靈生命既在於與他的創造者合一,所以他一旦和他疏遠,即是靈魂死亡。所以說,他那破壞了天地間全部自然秩序的背叛,遺害及於子孫,也是不足為奇的。這遺傳的腐敗就是教父們所稱為的“原罪”;所謂“罪”,是指以前純良天性的腐化而言;他們對這問題有許多爭論;因為若說,一人犯罪叫大家成了罪人,而且他的罪成了眾人共犯的罪,好像沒有什麼比這種說明與常人的見解相距更遠的了;無怪乎古代教會的大部分學者,對這問題僅輕描淡寫,不願詳細說明This is the inherited corruption, which the church fathers termed “original sin,” meaning by the word “sin” the depravation of a nature previously good and pure. There was much contention over this matter, inasmuch as nothing is farther from the usual view than for all to be made guilty by the guilt of one, and thus for sin to be made common. This seems to be the reason why the most ancient doctors of the church touched upon this subject so obscurely. …. 所以有許多好人,其中尤以奥古斯丁,曾經積極證明我們的腐化墮落不是由於偶然,乃是與生倶來的墮落根性。Therefore, good men (and Augustine above the rest) labored to show us that we are corrupted not by derived wickedness, but that we bear inborn defect from our mother’s womb.

 

2.1.6我們現在知道,父母傳到兒女的污穢是開始生存之時就都沾染了的,然而我們若追溯到那猶如一切河流之源的始祖,便找不到污穢的根源。真的,亞當不但是祖先,也是人類的根源,所以全人類必定沾染了他的腐敗。We hear that the uncleanness of the parents is so transmitted to the children that all without any exception are defiled at their begetting. But we will not find the beginning of this pollution unless we go back to the first parent of all, as its source. We must surely hold that Adam was not only the progenitor but, as it were, the root of human nature; and that therefore in his corruption mankind deserved to be vitiated.

 

2.1.7我們要明瞭這個問題,不必對無謂的“靈魂傳論”多所爭辯;教父們常常辯論,關於靈魂既是沾染的主體,所以兒子的靈魂究竟是否從父親的靈魂傳而來的這個爭點。亞當就是這樣的一個墮落根源,以致一脈相承,永不斷絕地由父母傳到子女。但這沾染不是在身體或靈魂的本質上,而是由於上帝所預定,凡他賦與第一人的恩賜由這人為他自己及其子孫保存或喪失。 For the contagion does not take its origin from the substance of the flesh or soul, but because it had been so ordained by God that the first man should at one and the same time have and lose, both for himself and for his descendants, the gifts that God had bestowed upon him.

 

2.1.8為避免對這問題的一切誤會與猜疑,我們對原罪應下一界說。我不打算討論作家們的所下的一切定義;我僅提出一個我認為對的定義。原罪是我們本性上一種遺傳的邪惡與腐敗,散佈心靈的各部分,使我們為神的憤怒所憎惡,而且在我們裡面產生了聖經所說的“情欲的事”(519So that these remarks may not be made concerning an uncertain and unknown matter, let us define original sin. f13 It is not my intention to investigate the several definitions proposed by various writers, but simply to bring forward the one that appears to me most in accordance with truth. Original sin, therefore, seems to be a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused into all parts of the soul, which first makes us liable to God’s wrath, then also brings forth in us those works which Scripture calls “works of the flesh” [Galatians 5:59]. …. 奥古斯丁雖常稱這罪為別人的,為的是要更明白地指出這是由遺傳而傳及我們的,同時也說,這罪是每人自己的。使徒也明說:“於是死就臨到眾人,因為眾人都犯了罪”512;這即是說,他們陷於原罪之中,又為它所污染。所以嬰兒本身既然帶罪而生,他們受懲罰就不是因為別人的罪,乃是因為自己的罪。雖然他們還沒有結出罪的果子,但罪的種子已經撒在他們的心裡了,甚至他們整個本性也好像是一顆罪的種子,所以不能不為上帝所厭惡。所以在上帝眼前這也是罪,因為若沒有罪行,就不能有罪債For this reason, Augustine, though he often calls sin “another’s” to show more clearly that it is distributed among us through propagation, nevertheless declares at the same time that it is peculiar to each. And the apostle himself most eloquently testifies that “death has spread to all because all have sinned” [Romans 5:12]. That is, they have been enveloped in original sin and defiled by its stains. For that reason, even infants themselves, while they carry their condemnation along with them from the mother’s womb, are guilty not of another’s fault but of their own. For, even though the fruits of their iniquity have not yet come forth, they have the seed enclosed within them. Indeed, their whole nature is a seed of sin; hence it can be only hateful and abhorrent to God. From this it follows that it is rightly considered sin in God’s sight, for without guilt there would be no accusation.

 

2.1.9自從亞當離開公義的泉源以來,罪就佔有了靈魂的一切才能,這是我已經說過的For this reason, I have said that all parts of the soul were possessed by sin after Adam deserted the fountain of righteousness…. 可見我們心靈上崇高優美之處不僅受了創傷,而且腐到不可醫治的程度,以致非有一個新天性不可。From this it follows that that part in which the excellence and nobility of the soul especially shine has not only been wounded, but so corrupted that it needs to be healed and to put on a new nature as well.  

 

 

2.2. 人現在被剝奪了意志自由,並處於悲慘的奴役下

2.2.2按照他們的意見,在心靈中所有的功能,有理智,官感,和欲望,或意志意志這名稱現在用得更普遍。他們說,理智有理性;只要理性保持它的優越地位,行使它固有的能力,就是美好和幸福生活最優美的指南。心靈低等的功能稱為官感;心靈容易為官感所蒙蔽而陷於錯誤,然而官感可受理性的馴服,逐漸克服。他們把意志放在理性與官感二者之間;意志有完全的自由選擇權,可以服從理性的支配,或受官感的暴力控制。In their opinion those faculties of which I have spoken above — understanding, sense, appetite, or will (which last designation is now accepted in more common usage) — have their seat in the soul. These philosophers consequently declare that the understanding is endowed with reason, the best ruling principle for the leading of a good and blessed life, provided it sustains itself within its own excellence and displays the strength bestowed upon it by nature. But they state that the lower impulse, called sense,” by which man is drawn off into error and delusion is such that it can be tamed and gradually overcome by reasons rod. Further, they locate the will midway between reason and sense. That is, it possesses right and freedom of itself either to obey reason or to prostitute itself to be ravished by sense — whichever it pleases.

 

2.2.4在教會的作家中,雖沒有一人不承認人的理性受罪孽的損傷很重,而人的意志也因敗壞的情欲大受困惑,卻有許多人過於附和哲學家。All ecclesiastical writers have recognized both that the soundness of reason in man is gravely wounded through sin, and that the will has been very much enslaved by evil desires. Despite this, many of them have come far too close to the philosophers. …. 拉丁人常沿用“自由意志”這名詞,仿佛人還是保存著原始的完整;希臘人更不知羞,更僭妄地引用autexousion(自權)這字,似乎人對自己仍有統治的能力。The term “free will” has always been used among the Latins, as if man still remained upright. The Greeks were not ashamed to use a much more presumptuous word. They called it “self-power,” as if each man had power in his own hands. All — even the common folk — were imbued with this principle, that man is endowed with free will. …第一,他們覺得“意志的能力”(arbitrium)是指分辨善惡的理性;而“自由”這形容詞是指“意志的作用”(Voluntas),是可以向善,也可以向惡的。因自由理當屬於意志的作用,所以阿奎那說,如果稱自由意志為“選擇的能力”卻是一個恰當的定義;這能力包括知識和欲望,但以欲望的成分居多。First, they agree that the noun arbitrium ought rather to refer to reason, whose task it is to distinguish between good and evil; that the adjective liberum pertains properly to the will, which can be turned to one side or the other. Hence, Thomas says that, since freedom properly belongs to the will, it would be most suitable to call free will a “power of selection,” which, derived from a mingling of understanding and appetite, yet inclines more to appetite.

 

2.2.5凡不屬於上帝國的普通和外界的事物,他們大致都認為是由人的自由意志所決定,但他們把真正的公義看為是歸於上帝特殊的恩典和心靈的重生。Under man’s free counsel they commonly class those intermediate things which obviously do not pertain to God’s Kingdom; but they refer true righteousness to God’s special grace and spiritual regeneration. 為支援這一主張起見,那寫論外邦人的蒙召(On the Vocation of the Gentiles)的作者普羅斯泊St. Prosper,約五世紀中葉,把意志分為三類:第一是感覺的,第二是動物性的,第三是屬靈的;他說,前兩者完全由我們自己行使,最後一項是由聖靈在我們裡面工作。To show this, the author of the work The Calling of the Gentiles enumerates three kinds of will: first, the sensual; second, the psychic; third, the spiritual. With the first two, he teaches, man is freely endowed; the last is the work of the Holy Spirit in man. 在經院學派中常說有三種不同的自由:第一,脫離命運的自由,第二,脫離罪惡的自由,第三,脫離苦難的自由,第一種是人所天然具備,不能被奪的,而其餘兩項卻因罪而喪失了。這種區分我很贊同,不過把命運與強迫混而為一,似乎不妥。Now in the schools three kinds of freedom are distinguished: first from necessity, second from sin, third from misery. The first of these so inheres in man by nature that it cannot possibly be taken away, but the two others have been lost through sin. I willingly accept this distinction, except in so far as necessity is falsely confused with compulsion.[1]

 

2.2.6我們一經承認,除非有恩典的幫助—即那藉重生只給與選民的特殊恩典的幫助人就沒有為善的自由意志,是毫無疑義的,有些異端者以為恩典是平等而隨便地給與一切的人的,這種見解不值得考慮。If this be admitted, it will be indisputable that free will is not sufficient to enable man to do good works, unless he be helped by grace, indeed by special grace, which only the elect receive through regeneration. For I do not tarry over those fanatics who babble that grace is equally and indiscriminately distributed. 倫巴都為證實這主張起見,告訴我們說,我們要行善,必須有兩種恩賜的幫助。一種他稱為“獨作的恩典”(gratia operans)這是叫我們有效地立志為善;另一種他稱為“合作的恩典”(gratia cooperans),這是輔助我們的向善意志。我不喜歡這種分類,因為他雖把為善的有效願望歸於上帝的恩賜,然而又暗示人的本性原有向善的願望,不過沒有多大的效力而已;The Master of the Sentences meant to settle this point when he taught: “We need two kinds of grace to render us capable of good works.” He calls the first kind operating,” which ensures that we effectively will to do good. The second he calls “co-operating,” which follows the good will as a help. The thing that displeases me about this division is that, while he attributes the effective desire for good to the grace of God, yet he hints that man by his very own nature somehow seeks after the good — though ineffectively. 倫巴都至終宣稱,我們具有自由意志,不是我們在思想行動上的為善或為惡有同等權力,而只是因為我們不受強迫而已。並且我們雖是墮落的,又是罪的奴隸,且只能犯罪,但這種自由並沒有減少。For Lombard finally declares that we have free will, not in that we are equally capable of doing or thinking good and evil, but merely that we are freed from compulsion. According to Lombard, this freedom is not hindered, even if we be wicked and slaves of sin, and can do nothing but sin.

 

2.2.7那麼所謂人有自由意志,不是說他在善惡的選擇上有同等的自由,乃是因為他是自動作惡,而非受強迫所致。這當然是很真的,但何苦用這麼偉大的名目去點綴那麼微小的事呢Man will then be spoken of as having this sort of free decision, not because he has free choice equally of good and evil, but because he acts wickedly by will, not by compulsion. Well put, indeed, but what purpose is served by labeling with a proud name such a slight thing? A noble freedom, indeed — for man not to be forced to serve sin, yet to be such a willing slave that his will is bound by the fetters of sin! …. 因為差不多所有教父的繼起人都忽視了教父們的解釋,只研究這名詞的語源,以致陷入可怕的自信。For, overlooking that interpretation of the ancient writers, almost all their successors, while they have clung to the etymological meaning of the word, have been carried into a ruinous self-assurance.

 

2.2.8尤其奥古斯丁毫不猶豫地稱意志為奴隸。他在某處明說對否認自由意志的人,不滿,然而據他所說的主要原因,乃是“不要讓任何人借否認意志,來掩飾罪過。”他在別處明白地承認,若沒有聖靈,人的意志既然隨從情欲,為情欲所征服,意志便沒有自由。他又說,當意志為罪所克服,本性就再沒有自由了。又說,人一旦誤用了自己的自由意志,他自己與意志都一同喪失了。First of all, there is Augustine, who does not hesitate to call it “unfree.”[servum] Elsewhere he is angry toward those who deny that the will is free; but he states his main reason in these words: “Only let no one so dare to deny the decision of the will as to wish to excuse sin.” Yet elsewhere he plainly confesses that “without the Spirit man’s will is not free, since it has been laid under by shackling and conquering desires.” Likewise, when the will was conquered by the vice into which it had fallen, human nature began to lose its freedom. Again, man, using free will badly, has lost both himself and his will.[2]所以誰用這名詞若用得恰當,我就不反對他;但因為我覺得沿用這名詞難免危險,而廢除這名詞對教會較為有益,所以我自己既不願意用它,而且希望凡尊重我意見的人,也不要用它。If anyone, then, can use this word without understanding it in a bad sense, I shall not trouble him on this account.But I hold that because it cannot be retained without great peril, it will, on the contrary, be a great boon for the church if it be abolished. I prefer not to use it myself, and I should like others, if they seek my advice, to avoid it.

 

2.2.12我很贊同從奥古斯丁借來的意見,認為人所稟賦的自然才能因犯罪而敗壞,並且超自然的才能也全被剝奪;後者所指即那足以使人達到天上生活和永遠幸福的信仰之光與正義。And, indeed, that common opinion which they have taken from Augustine pleases me: that the natural gifts were corrupted in man through sin, but that his supernatural gifts were stripped from him.[3] 所以當人在背叛神的治理,那原來使他有永遠得救希望的超自然稟賦,就被奪了。For by the latter

clause they understand the light of faith as well as righteousness, which would be sufficient to attain heavenly life and eternal bliss. 這一切包括信仰,對上帝和鄰舍的愛,並對聖潔與公義的愛慕。這一切憑基督恢復的,都當看做意外和非常的事。這樣的話,我們可以推斷,它們是已經失去了的。再者,健全的思想和正直的感情都已毀滅;這即是自然天才的敗壞。我們雖保留了一部分知識與判斷力,和局部的意志,但我們軟弱黑暗的心思不能說是完全和健康的,並且我們意志墮落腐化的情況是人所共知的。因此,那分辨善惡和具有理解與判斷力的理性,既是一種天賦的才能,自不能全部被毀,乃是局部衰敗玷污,以致殘缺不全。Among these are faith, love of God, charity toward neighbor, zeal for holiness and for righteousness. All these, since Christ restores them in us, are considered adventitious, and beyond nature: and for this reason we infer that they were taken away. On the other hand, soundness of mind and uprightness of heart were withdrawn at the same time. This is the corruption of the natural gifts. For even though something of understanding and judgment remains as a residue along with the will, yet we shall not call a mind whole and sound that is both weak and plunged into deep darkness. And depravity of the will is all too well known. Since reason, therefore, by which man distinguishes between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be completely wiped out; but it was partly weakened and partly corrupted, so that its misshapen ruins appear. 約翰說過,光照在黑暗裡,黑暗卻不接受光參約15。這節經文說明了兩種意義:一方面,人性雖在敗壞退化的狀態中仍然有些火花續繼照耀,這證明人是理性的動物,和禽獸不同,因為他有智力;不過另一方面,這種光明為愚昧所蒙,不能發生任何效力。意志既不能和人性分開,所以沒有完全滅絕,但它已被腐敗的欲望所束縛,不能期望於至善。John speaks in this sense: “The light still shines in the darkness, but the darkness  comprehends it not” [John 1:5]. In these words both facts are clearly expressed. First, in man’s perverted and degenerate nature some sparks still gleam. These show him to be a rational being, differing from brute beasts, because he is endowed with understanding. Yet, secondly, they show this light choked with dense ignorance, so that it cannot come forth effectively. Similarly the will, because it is inseparable from man’s nature, did not perish, but was so bound to wicked desires that it cannot strive after the right.

 

2.2.13 THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO EARTHLY THINGS AND THE FORM OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY但心思的努力不常是這樣無結果,尤以在研究次要事物之時,也會有所發現。對首要事物的探討,它雖不甚注意,卻也不至蠢到連淡薄的觀念也沒有;不過它對兩者沒有同等的能力而已。因為只人當它的追求在超過現世的生活範圍以外,它才深知自己的無能。為明瞭心思對各種不同事物之能力的程度起見,最好把它分為兩類,一類為地上的事物,另一類為天上的事物那屬地上的事物,是指那不屬於上帝和他的國,也不屬真公義或來生的幸福,乃是完全指目前的生活和在它範圍以內的事。天上的事物是指對上帝的認識,真公義的方法和天國的奧秘。第一類包括民政,家事和其它一切文藝與科學;第二類包括對上帝和他旨意的認識,以及在我們生活中與這認識相配合的規律。 Yet its efforts do not always become so worthless as to have no effect, especially when it turns its attention to things below. On contrary, it is intelligent enough to taste something of things above, although it is more careless about investigating these. Nor does it carry on this latter activity with equal skill. For when the mind is borne above the level of the present life, it is especially convinced of its own frailty. Therefore, to perceive more clearly how far the mind can proceed in any matter according to the degree of its ability, we must here set forth a distinction. This, then, is the distinction: that there is one kind of understanding of earthly things; another of heavenly. I call “earthly things” those which do not pertain to God or his Kingdom, to true justice, or to the blessedness of the future life; but which have their significance and relationship with regard to the present life and are, in a sense, confined within its bounds. I call “heavenly things” the pure knowledge of God, the nature of true righteousness, and the mysteries of the Heavenly Kingdom. The first class includes government, household management, all mechanical skills, and the liberal arts. In the second are the knowledge of God and of his will, and the rule by which we conform our lives to it. 關於第一類,我們必須承認,人既是合群的動物,他的本性也有助長保存社會的本能,所以我們在各人思想中都可以看出對民政和秩序共有的觀念。因此,誰都知道人的一切組合非受法律統治不可,也都能明瞭這些律法的原則。…. 人心即令似乎走上了正軌而又躊躇不前,就足以證明人心的虛弱。但政治秩序觀念的種子,已撒在一般人的心裡,卻是確實的事;這足以證明任何人的本性都不缺理性的亮光。 Hence arises that unvarying consent of all nations and of individual mortals with regard to laws. For their seeds have, without teacher or lawgiver, been implanted in all men.

 

2.2.14其次就是文學和手藝,因為我們都有多少學習的能量,所以在學習藝術中可以發現人類的技巧。雖然各人未必都有學習每一項藝術的才能,但幾乎每人總在某一門有獨到之處,這樣就足以證明,普通才能是人人都有的Then follow the arts, both liberal and manual. The power of human acuteness also appears in learning these because all of us have a certain aptitude. But although not all the arts are suitable for everyone to learn, yet it is a certain enough indication of the common energy that hardly anyone is to be found who does not manifest talent in some art.  

 

2.2.15所以,當我們看到真理之光在異教作家的著作中表現出來,就要知道,人心雖已墮落,不如最初之完全無缺,但仍然稟賦著上帝所賜優異的天才。如果我們相信,上帝的聖靈是真理唯一的源泉,那麼,不論真理在何處表現,我們都不能拒絕或藐視它,除非我們敢於侮辱上帝之靈;因為輕視對聖靈的恩賜,就是藐視與責怪聖靈本身Whenever we come upon these matters in secular writers, let that admirable light of truth shining in them teach us that the mind of man, though fallen and perverted from its wholeness, is nevertheless clothed and ornamented with God’s excellent gifts. If we regard the Spirit of God as the sole fountain of truth, we shall neither reject the truth itself, nor despise it wherever it shall appear, unless we wish to dishonor the Spirit of God. 聖經上所稱為“屬血氣的人”既在研究世間的事物上表現了這麼多的天才,我們就應該知道,在人性最優之點被被剝奪以後,主還給它留下許多美好的品性Those men whom Scripture [1 Corinthians 2:14] calls “natural men” were, indeed, sharp and penetrating in their investigation of inferior things. Let us, accordingly, learn by their example how many gifts the Lord left to human nature even after it was despoiled of its true good.

 

2.2.16我們不要忘記,聖靈的這些美好恩賜,是他為人類的共同利益,願意賜給誰就賜給誰的。如果上帝的靈灌輸到比撒列和亞何利亞的心裡,叫他們有充分智慧和技巧建造會幕參出31 2-1135 30-35,那末,若說人生中最優秀的知識是由上帝的靈而來,我們就不必認為奇怪了。Meanwhile, we ought not to forget those most excellent benefits of the divine Spirit, which he distributes to whomever he wills, for the common good of mankind. The understanding and knowledge of Bezalel and Oholiab, needed to construct the Tabernacle, had to be instilled in them by the Spirit of God [Exodus 31:2-11; 35:30-35].

 

2.2.17因此可以斷言,理性是我們天性中使我們有別於禽獸的特質,如同知覺使禽獸有別於無生命之物。雖有些人是天生的愚笨和白,但這個缺陷並不足以掩蔽上帝的良善。這樣的景況倒足以告訴我們,我們所保留的天性,是由於上帝的寬大,因為若他不恤我們,我們整個天性將因我們的背叛而全部毀滅。To sum up: We see among all mankind that reason is proper to our nature; it distinguishes us from brute beasts, just as they by possessing feeling differ from inanimate things. Now, because some are born fools or stupid, that defect does not obscure the general grace of God. Rather, we are warned by that spectacle that we ought to ascribe what is left in us to God’s kindness. For if he had not spared us, our fall would have entailed the destruction of our whole nature.

 

2.2.18現在我們要研究,關於上帝的國和屬靈的智慧等問題,人的理智能夠發現些什麼。屬靈的智慧包括三件事,即:認識上帝,認我們所賴以得救的他的父愛,和認識那依照律法規範生活的方法。雖最聰明的人對前兩點,特別是第二點,比鼴鼠還更盲目。We must now analyze what human reason can discern with regard to God’s Kingdom and to spiritual insight. This spiritual insight consists chiefly in three things:

(1) knowing God;

(2) knowing his fatherly favor in our behalf, in which our salvation consists;

(3) knowing how to frame our life according to the rule of his law.

 

2.2.22現在我們還要討論第三類的知識,即那規範我們生活的規則。我們稱之為義行的知識;人的心思在這種知識中,比在前兩種知識中更為精明。因為使徒說,“沒有律法的外人,若順著本性行律法上的事,他們雖沒有律法,自己就是自己的律法;這是顯出律法的功用刻在他們心裡,他們是非之心同作見證,並且他們的思念互相較量,或以為是,或以為非”(21415There remains the third aspect of spiritual insight, that of knowing the rule for the right conduct of life. This we correctly call the “knowledge of the works of righteousness.” The human mind sometimes seems more acute in this than in higher things. For the apostle testifies: “When Gentiles, who do not have the law, do the works of the law, they are a law to themselves... and show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their thoughts accuse them among themselves or excuse them before God’s judgment” [Romans 2:14-15].

 

2.2.24當你聽說,在人心中有分辨善惡的普遍判斷力,你不要以為這判斷力在各方面都是健全完善的。Now when you hear of a universal judgment discriminating between good and evil, do not consider it to be sound and whole in every respect.

 

2.3.13 奧古斯丁:因此,亚当若有意志,就有能力,但他却不愿意有这能力;而赐给我们的乃是意志与能力。原来的自由是‘能不犯罪’(Posse non peccare),但我们所有更大的自由乃是‘不能犯罪’(non posse pecare)。Therefore, he had the ability if he had so willed, but he did not will that he should be able. To us it is given both to will and to be able. The original freedom was to be able not to sin; but ours is much greater, not to be able to sin.[4]

 

2.4上帝在人心中的運行

2.4.2在同樣的事上,神運行的方法卻非常不同。我們可用約伯在迦勒底人手上所受的災難為例,以說明這運行的方法(參伯1章)。迦勒底人殺他的牧人,又劫了他的牲畜。他們所行的不義昭然若揭;可是撒但在這些事上不是無關的。因為聖經說,這整個事件是起源於撒但的。但約伯自己認為這是上帝的工作;他說,迦勒底人從他所掠奪的財物,是上帝收取的。若不原諒撒但,以他為上帝的夥伴,或把上帝看為惡的創始者,那麼,我們怎能把同一行動同歸於上帝,撒但,和人呢?我們若先檢討這行動的目的,其次研究它的執行方式,就不難解決這問題了。上帝的目的是以災難訓練他僕人的忍耐性;撒但的目的是盡力叫他失望;迦勒底人的目的是作奸犯科,以他人的財產飽自己的私囊。目的既如此懸殊,行為就彼此互異,執行的方式也是不同了。Far different is the manner of God’s action in such matters. To make this clearer to us, we may take as an example the calamity inflicted by the Chaldeans upon the holy man Job, when they killed his shepherds and in enmity ravaged his flock [Job 1:17]. Now their wicked act is perfectly obvious; nor does Satan do nothing in that work, for the history states that the whole thing stems from him [Job 1:12]. But Job himself recognizes the Lord’s work in it, saying that He has taken away what had been seized through the Chaldeans [Job 1:21]. How may we attribute this same work to God, to Satan, and to man as author, without either excusing Satan as associated with God, or making God the author of evil? Easily, if we consider first the end, and then the manner, of acting. The Lord’s purpose is to exercise the patience of His servant by calamity; Satan endeavors to drive him to desperation; the Chaldeans strive to acquire gain from another’s property contrary to law and right. So great is the diversity of purpose that already strongly marks the deed.

 

2.4.3教父們有時過於謹慎,對這問題不敢坦白地承認真理,惟恐引起對上帝工作的不敬和侮辱。我對這種審慎的態度雖深表同情,但我覺得只要事事根據聖經,就沒有什麼危險了。甚至奥古斯丁也不免過於顧慮;例如,他認為盲目無情不是上帝所運行的,乃是上帝的預知。但這巧妙的說法與經上無數的說明是不相符的;聖經所指的,分明是上帝的干預,而不僅是預知,奥古斯丁自己在其所著斥猶利安(Contra Julianum)的第五卷中說。罪惡不僅是由許可或預知所生,乃是由上帝的權力所生,為叫以前的罪因此受懲罰。

WHAT DOES “HARDNESS” MEAN?

The church fathers sometimes scrupulously shrink from a simple confession of the truth because they are afraid that they may open the way for the impious to speak irreverently of God’s works. As I heartily approve of this soberness, so do I deem it in no way dangerous if we simply adhere to what Scripture teaches. At times not even Augustine was free of that superstition; for example, he says that hardening and blinding refer not to God’s activity but to his foreknowledge. Yet very many expressions of Scripture do not admit these subtleties, but clearly show that something more than God’s mere foreknowledge is involved. And Augustine himself in the Against Julian, Book V, argues at great length that sins happen not only by God’s permission and forbearance, but by his might, as a kind of punishment for sins previously committed.



[1] Lombard, Sentences II. 25:9 (MPL 192. 708); Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio 3. 7 (MPL 182. 1005; tr. W. W. Williams, Concerning Grace and Free Will, pp. 15 f.).

[2] In primis Augustinus, qui non dubitat servum appellare. Alicubi succenset adversus eos qui liberum negant arbitrium: sed praecipuam rationem declarat, quum ait, Tantum ne audeat quisquam sic negare voluntatis arbitrium, ut velit excusare peccatum. At certe alibi fatetur sine Spiritu non esse liberam hominis voluntatem, quum cupiditatibus vincientibus ac vincentibus subdita sit. Item, victa vitio in quod cecidit voluntate, coepisse carere libertate naturam. Item, hominem libero arbitrio male usum, et se et arbitrium suum perdidisse.

[3] Augustine, On Nature and Grace 3. 3. 19:2l; 20:22 (MPL 44. 249,256 f.; tr. NPNF V. 122, 127 f.).

[4] Gratiam persistendi in bono, Adae fuisse datam si vellet: nobis dari ut velimus, ac voluntate concupiscentiam superemus. Habuisse ergo illum posse si vellet: sed non velle ut posset: nobis et velle dari et posse. Primam fuisse libertatem, posse non peccare: nostram multo maiorem, non posse peccare.